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Introduction―Why ontology?
The connection between ontology and political 
theory has been much more discussed in recent 
works of the discipline. 1 William E. Connolly has 
been on the leading edge of the debate over the 
two decades. From his earliest career, Connolly 
has widened and innovated the scope of political 
theory. His coherent concern is with radicalizing 
a democracy, both in theory and in practice.
Why ontology?
One possible answer is that basic ontological 
presuppositions of a thinker affect his/her views 
of political life and thereby the manners in 
which to construct his/ her theory. My research 
aim is to elucidate an ontology in Connolly’s 
political theory in sharp contrast to other 
contemporary theorists who try to shun 
ontological dimensions. Connolly believes that 
publ ic discourse invariably draws upon 
contestable ontological themes which impinge 
upon the treatment of people 2 and therefore, 
affirmation of, and mutual recognition of, one’s 
ontology and another’s is necessary.
Etymologically speaking, ontology derives 
from onta, meaning the really existing things, so 
ontology is the study of the fundamental logic of 
reality apart from appearances. Connolly sees 
these determinations as too restrictive and too 
total. 3 He then uses the term ontopolitical. Every 
interpretation of political events is ontopolitical. 4 
Its fundamental presumptions fix possibilities, 
distribute explanatory elements, generate 
parameters within which an ethic is elaborated, 
and center (or decenter) assessments of identity, 
legitimacy, and responsibility. 5
This dimension has been neglected in 
human sciences. Connolly links this neglect 
to the rise of secularism. 6 With the decay of 
Aristotelian teleology in modern philosophy 
and of Christian doctrines of creation, human 
sciences have a stance to explain the world as 
it is, though the conceptions of the fundamental 
order of the world are offered by these 
traditional perspectives. Modern secularism 
has progressively eliminated the ontopolitical 
dimension. Since the most basic conflicts, 
problems, and issues facing contemporary 
life flow from the fundamental presumptions 
of modernity, it is necessary to make these 
presumptions explicit objects of reflection. 7
In addition, Connolly points to the primacy 
of epistemology as another reason why 
American social sciences have been able to 
bypass the debate on ontology. 8 The primacy 
of epistemology 9 is “to think either that you 
have access to criteria of knowledge that leave 
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the realm of ontology behind or that your 
epistemology provides neutral test procedures 
through which to pose and resolve every 
ontological question.” 10
The primacy of epistemology is, in itself, a 
contestable social ontology. 11 It is subjected to 
careful examination and reassessment.
Then, why is Connolly deeply engaged in 
ontology, when liberal and other thinkers show 
restraint from ontological or metaphysical 
dimensions because of their irreducible character?
Clearly, there is a sense of crisis that the 
forces hostile to pluralist democracy emerge 
paradoxical ly from within democracies , 
driven by populist anxieties and “collective 
resentments” directed towards foreigners, 
immigrants, minorities, and the socially and 
economically marginalized. 12
He analyzes that contemporary liberalism 
is an object of public resentment. 13 Many 
liberal-welfare programs practiced in the 
1960s to redress injustice have been received 
as new injustices forced upon a variety of 
constituencies, especially white working-class 
males. Those programs were regarded as 
touching their identities rather than rewarding 
them and worse still, the liberal programs 
accentuate and at the same time subdue their 
resentment with the rhetoric that they are 
responsible for their own successes and failures 
in life. 14 Liberal individualism helps to dig a well 
of resentment that then flows into the culture in 
which it participates. 15
Connolly’s commitment to ontology, therefore, 
can be interpreted as attempts to break out 
of the impasse of a liberalism in which such 
neutralism is the “norm” and to redirect and 
rework political theory by “politicizing” ontology. 
For preceding research on Connolly’s political 
theory and his ontology, Jeremy Valentine’s 
“Time, Politics and Contingency” (2010) 16 and 
Clayton Chin’s “Ontology, Time, and Identity in 
the Work of Richard Rorty and William E. 
Connolly” (2010) 17 can be taken as examples. 
Both try to abstract the meaning of Connolly’s 
conception of ontology in comparison with other 
theorists, but do not sufficiently delineate 
Connolly’s agenda for “situating democracy 
within a philosophy of dissonant holism,” 18 an 
agenda for mobilizing collective action. 
The present paper proceeds in the following 
way. First, we make a comparison between 
Connolly and those thinkers like John Rawls and 
Richard Rorty who try to shun ontological 
discussions. Second, as a concretization of his 
ontology, the conceptions of contingency and 
identity are examined, specifically as opposed to 
Rorty. Liberalism, when faced with a disruptive 
challenge to its own principles, takes two 
directions: (1) to locate a place for this disruptive 
force within the system or (2) to find grounds to 
exclude that force from the system and then to 
ignore it. 19 Connolly chooses the former and 
Rorty the latter. While both share in critical 
insight into underlying assumptions of social 
sciences, they diverge on the conceptions on 
public life against differences in ontological 
commitment. In the final section, a world of 
becoming as a prospective ontology of Connolly’s 
is laid out, with a focus on the problem of 
agency. 
1  Contending Approaches to Ontology
1‒1  Avoidance of Ontology
There are two distinct groups in respect to 
ontology: to embrace or to try to eschew it. The 
representatives of the latter are John Rawls and 
Richard Rorty. Connolly’s critique of liberalism 
runs on its exclusion of metaphysics from 
political thought and practice. The hegemony of 
Rawl’s postmodern liberalism is the obvious but 
unidentified target of that critique. 20
Indeed, John Rawls avoids the dimension. In 
his 1985 essay “Justice as Fairness: Political Not 
Metaphysical,” Rawls proclaims his stance. 21 To 
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formulate a political conception of justice for 
constitutional democracy, Rawls asserts that 
“the public conception of justice should be, so 
far as possible, independent of controversial 
philosophical and religious doctrines.” 22 He 
emphasizes again: “Philosophy as the search 
for truth about an independent metaphysical 
and moral order, cannot, I believe, provide 
a workable and shared basis for a political 
conception of justice in a democratic society.” 23 
For Rawls, this method of avoidance, i.e. the 
application of the principle of toleration to 
philosophy itself is both necessary and sufficient. 
Existing differences between contending 
political views can be moderated, if not entirely 
removed, by this method to maintain social 
cooperation on the basis of mutual respect. 24 
His aim was to provide a justification for 
excluding apparently rival and incommensurate 
metaphysical positions from matters of justice 
so as to avoid irresolvable political conflicts 
seeking to uphold its position at the expense of 
the other. 25
In Political Liberalism, Rawls restates his 
position: “by avoiding comprehensive doctrines 
we try to bypass religion and philosophy’s 
profoundest controversies so as to have some 
hope of uncovering a basis of a stable overlapping 
consensus.” 26 This abstinence from metaphysical 
and ontological reflection might be inscribed in 
the western cultural tradition. 27 Rawls adopts a 
position within it, but removes its internal 
controversies without taking seriously the denial 
and danger lodged within the tradition. 28
Another who refuses to engage metaphysical 
questions is Richard Rorty. As a neo pragmatist 
Rorty calls himself a “liberal ironist.” According 
to Rorty, “liberals” are people who think that 
cruelty is the worst thing we do. “Ironist” is the 
sort of person who faces up to the contingency 
of his or her own most central beliefs and 
desires and abandons the idea that those central 
beliefs and desires refer back to something 
beyond the reach of time and chance. 29 Liberal 
ironists are those who include among these 
ungroundable desires their own hope that 
suffering will be diminished and the humiliation 
of human beings by other human beings may 
cease. 30
Rorty envisions a l iberal utopia which 
makes human solidarity possible. This utopia 
is not discovered by reflection but created 
by increasing sensitivity to the pain and 
humiliation of others, by imagining them 
as fellow sufferers. 31 However, the detailed 
description of those suffering as “one of us,” not 
as unfamiliar and strange, requires no theory; 
it is not a task for theory but for literary works 
and journalism. 32
For Rorty, to pursue private perfection as a 
self-created, autonomous human life is one thing 
and to engage in making our public institutions 
and practices more just and less cruel is quite 
another. There is no single comprehensive 
philosophical outlook in which these apparently 
opposing attempts, private perfection and 
human solidarity are included. 33 The aim of a 
just and free society is to let its citizens be as 
privatistic, “irrationalist,” and aestheticist as 
they please as long as they cause no harm to 
others and use no resources needed by the less 
advantaged. 34 Although there are practical 
measures to be taken to achieve that goal, there 
is no theory to bring the two together, because 
the vocabulary used in the former self-creation 
and perfection is private, and so inappropriate 
to argument, and in contrast, that used in the 
latter discussion of justice is public and shared. 35 
One who believes in an order beyond time and 
change which determines the point of human 
existence and establishes a hierarchy of 
responsibilities is, in Rorty’s view, a theologian 
or a metaphysician. 36
Now we shou ld  pay at tent ion to  the 
“metaphysics” that Rorty conceives of. He 
contraposes a metaphysician with an ironist. 
An ironist must fulfill the three conditions: 
(1) having radical and continuing doubts 
武田菜穂子：Politicizing Ontology
4
about the final vocabulary currently used; 
(2) realizing that argument phrased in the 
present vocabulary can neither underwrite 
nor dissolve these doubts; and (3) insofar as 
the ironist philosophizes about her situation, 
she does not think that her vocabulary is 
closer to reality than others. 37 In contrast, 
metaphysicians believe that we already possess 
a lot of the “right” final vocabulary and merely 
think through its implications. Rorty says that 
the opposite of irony is common sense. 38 The 
metaphysician is attached to common sense. He 
does not question the platitude which says there 
is a single permanent reality to be found behind 
the many temporary appearances. 39 In sum, the 
ironist seeks for the new; the metaphysician 
the old; the former for change and the latter 
for stability. However, this characterization of 
metaphysics is too shallow and itself represents 
some sort of metaphysics or ontology. The 
separation of the private sphere from the 
public is also a kind of dogmatization, which 
may set up a blind side into which the forces 
undermining the culture of liberalism creep, just 
as the secularism of liberalism does. 
1‒2  Affirmation of Ontology
Connolly strives to “expose the contestable 
character of opposing ontological projections 
by working against them from the inside” to 
advance a social ontology “challenging those that 
have implicitly governed the matrix within which 
much contemporary political reflection occurs.” 40 
To idealize politics, it is necessary to recognize 
that fundamental presumptions are unavoidable 
and that it is unlikely to secure knowledge of 
their truth, and on that recognition an ideal of 
political discourse should be based. 41
By “social ontology,” he means “a set of 
fundamental understandings about the relations 
of humans to themselves, to others, and to the 
world” 42  ; it is neither an Aristotelian ontology in 
which the world is understood to be a place 
where human beings can, when their common 
life is properly constituted, realize the telos 
appropriate to them, nor a Christian view of the 
world in which the issues of life are defined by 
the proper relations of creatures to their 
creator. 43 Ontology ought not to be singular; it is 
plural and contestable. 
“Contestation” is one of the defining features 
of Connolly’s political theory. 44 He argues that 
the language of politics is not a neutral medium 
but an institutionalized structure of meanings 
channeled into political thought and action. His 
interest is not in universal properties of 
language but in culturally configured linguistic 
meanings, the way in which meaning comes to 
fill out our concepts and is shaped by the 
politics that constitute the rules governing 
conceptual application. 45 Conceptual meaning 
has several dimensions, or plurality. All concepts 
are formed as “clusters” of other concepts; 
concepts are relational. In addition, the multiple 
criteria of cluster concepts reflect the theory in 
which they are embedded, and a change in the 
criteria of any of these concepts is likely to 
involve a change in the theory itself. 46
Another is “agonistic respect.” Agonistic 
respect is a civic virtue that allows people 
to honor different final sources, to cultivate 
reciprocal respect across difference, and to 
negotiate larger assemblages to set general 
policies. It is a reciprocal virtue appropriate to 
a world in which partisans find themselves in 
intensive relations of political interdependence. 47 
It affirms the indispensability and unavoidability 
of fundamental presumptions and conceptions 
but disturbs their dogmatization and folds 
care for the protean diversity and plurality of 
being into political life. 48 Democratic agonism 
does not exhaust political space but leaves 
room for modes of attachment and detachment. 
To cult ivate agonist ic respect between 
interdependent and contending constituencies is 
significant to support human dignity. 49 Through 
agonism, each party maintains a pathos of 
distance from others with whom it is engaged. 
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Through respect, setting limits is acknowledged 
and connections across lines of difference are 
established. 50 Your own faith is contestable and 
to treat it as such in your own eye’s, not just 
to affirm that it is contestable in the eye of 
others. 51
These two characteristics of Connolly’s are 
closely linked to his metaphysical or ontological 
commitment to pluralism. His pluralism is 
not “a fact of reasonable pluralism” or “value 
pluralism,” which reduces pluralism to values 
and cultural traditions and tries to reconcile 
a plurality of cultural values within a singular 
political order. Value pluralism is “neither a 
philosophical idea nor a political position; rather 
it is merely a description of the late modern 
world in which we live.” 52 Connolly’s pluralism 
is one which stretches over an ontology which 
seeps into one’s perception of and sensibility of 
the world, and from which one’s presumptions 
spring and on which to forge a political theory. 
It also supports an active pluralization of ethical 
sources in public life. It is to propel another 
source into public and political life without 
claiming that everyone must affirm it, thus 
breaking with a secularism that seeks to confine 
faith to the private realm and also with a theo-
centered vision that seeks to unite people 
behind one true faith. 53
This faith-woven philosophy seems inspired 
by William James, an architect of pragmatism as 
a branch of American philosophy. 54
James crit ic izes that scientists rarely 
understand their own commitments or the 
limited scope of scientific objectivity and that 
they are often tempted to make unwarranted 
pronouncements on non-scientific issues. 55 
Science “can tell us what exists; but to compare 
the worths, both of what exists and of what does 
not exist, we must consult not science, but what 
Pascal calls our heart. ” 56 One’s faith acts on the 
powers above us as a claim and creates its own 
verification. 57 James attacks the scientific 
absolutists who say definitely that faith running 
ahead of scientific evidence is the “lowest kind 
of immorality” where faith in a fact can help 
create the fact. 58 His strategy is to defend the 
legitimacy of religious faith against the idols or 
hubris of science, and not to place religion as 
opposed to science. 59
Like James, Connolly tries to expose the 
ontology which has implicitly governed the 
framework within which contemporary political 
reflection occurs. 60 Working with and against 
it is open to another ontological reflection, 
eventually seeding a field of political theory.
2  Anatomy of Ontology in  
Political Theory
2‒1  Conceptions of Contingency and Identity
Connolly and Rorty cast a critical eye on 
positivism and draw upon linguistic philosophy, 
but according to Connolly, Rorty has a different 
vision of politics clothed in the same language 
contingency. 61
Like Connolly, Rorty rejects the view of 
language as a representational, neutral medium. 62 
He partly has recourse to the work by Donald 
Davidson in philosophy of language, trying to 
drop the idea of intrinsic property of language 
and instead to face up to the contingency of the 
language we use. 63 Rorty sees the history of 
language as the history of metaphor. 64 It is a 
non-teleological view of language, something as 
a consequence of contingency. Our language 
and our culture are “as much a result of 
thousands of small mutations finding niches as 
are the orchids and the anthropoids.” 65 Rorty 
thinks of the constellations of causal forces 
which produced talk of DNA or of the Big Bang 
as of a piece with the causal forces which 
produced talk of “secularization” or of “late 
capitalism.” These various constellations are 
random: some things are made the subjects of 
conversation and others not; some projects are 
made possible and important and others not. 66 
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This recognition of the contingency of language 
leads to a recognition of the contingency of 
conscience, of selfhood, and of community. 
Rorty sees the moral consciousness as 
historically conditioned, a product of time and 
change as of political or aesthetic consciousness. 67 
This is also the case with one’s sense of self-
identity: “Anything from the sound of a word 
through the color of a leaf to the feel of a 
piece of skin can, as Freud showed us, serve 
to dramatize and crystallize a human being’s 
sense of self-identity.” Any seemingly random 
constellation of such things can set the tone of a 
life. 68
How about Connolly?
He also asserts the contingent character of 
identity. Identity is contingent in five meanings: 
(1) specific traits and dispositions installed in 
a self are socially mediated, and so contingent; 
(2) the specific set of defining you is contingent 
because the entire complex is formed through 
a complex history of parental relations, 
events, experiences, and contingent biological 
endowments; (3) some elements are crucial to 
the constitution of your identity while others are 
more likely dispensable attributes you can either 
maintain or drop; (4) identity has a political 
dimension of contingency in its constitution. To 
what degree one’s contingent dispositions are 
treated as part of one’s identity and in what 
way these dispositions are constituted through 
socially established standards are a powerful 
element; and (5) some elements entering into 
your identity are susceptible to reconstruction 
and others remain highly resistant to it even if 
you desire to transform them. This is a branded 
contingency, something that cannot be changed 
through will or decision. 69 So your identity is 
contingent and deep. Connolly says:
Identity without capitalization: my identity is 
entrenched, as well as particular in the sense 
that no set of universal statements about 
humanity or reason or rights or the necessity 
of death can exhaust it; but it is neither 
chosen in its fullest sense nor grounded in 
a harmonious direction in being. It is deep 
in its contingency. It is contingent in the 
sense that happenstances of genetics, family 
life, historically specific traditions, personal 
anxieties, demands, and aspirations, surprising 
events (the death of a parent, the intrusion 
of a war) all enter into its composition and 
give shape to the porous universals that mark 
me as human. It is deep in the sense that 
some of these elements become impressed 
into me as second nature, bonded to my first 
nature and not readily detachable from it …
This recognition may enable me to live more 
of the elements in my identity as contingent 
formations that do not reflect the truth of 
being as such. 70
A more modest, contingent view of your own 
identity is necessary, because the quest for true 
identity seeds existential resentment that tries 
to locate an appropriate object that it is directed 
against. 71
To accept the contingency of identity, at the 
same time, requires considerable work on the 
self; it is “to take a significant step toward 
increasing tolerance for a range of antinomies in 
oneself, countering the demand to treat close 
internal unity as the model toward which all 
selves naturally tend when they are in touch 
with themselves, shifting part of the primacy 
currently attached to the will when the question 
of self-modification arises.” 72 It is “to strive to 
convert an antagonism of identity into an 
agonism of  d i f ference . ” 73 For Connol ly , 
contingency is of ethical character.
This contingent character of identity is, 
moreover, inseparably connected with freedom 
and mortal i ty .  Recognit ion of mortal i ty 
“encourages the self to contribute to the 
crystallization of its own individuality.” 74 The 
relation of individuality to this recognition 
is ambiguous for the exercise of freedom. 
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You cannot pursue every valued option at 
the same time and in series in the finitude 
of time. Making a choice means ruling out 
alternative possibilities. Time weighs on 
freedom because implicit prevision of death 
inches your every decision in some fundamental 
way. 75 Foreknowledge of death, on the other 
hand, connects you, the individualized self to 
a larger world, both in enabling and disabling 
ways. The fear of death and gratitude for life 
play a significant role in connecting you to 
the larger world. Your life efforts do not only 
pay to yourself. Your current contribution 
may connect you to others and a future that 
continues after your death. Your specific, daily 
performances implicate yourself in the destiny 
of the order to which you belong. 76 Connolly 
calls this ambiguity of freedom the unconscious 
phenomenology of life and death. 77
In his diagnosis, however, this phenomenology, 
which presupposes a relatively stable and 
serene context of self-identity, social practice, 
state and interstate relations, and temporal 
projection, is disturbed and unsettled by three 
characteristics of contemporary life: (1)an 
intensification of the experience of owing one’s 
life and destiny to world-historical, national and 
local-bureaucratic forces; (2) a decline in the 
confidence many constituencies have in the 
probable future to which they find themselves 
contributing in daily life; and (3) an even more 
ominous set of future possibilities that weigh 
upon life in the present. 78 Late modernity as he 
calls it finds each of them distinctive enough in 
its newness, its intensity, and the degree of 
inscription to life experience. The problem is, 
Connolly thinks, that the standards of identity 
and responsibility remain the same, while the 
institution in which they are situated are far 
more highly and pervasively organized and as a 
result, one must program one’s life in so careful 
ways as to meet such institutionalized standards 
of the “normal” and entitlement. 79 Facing the 
demands of life with increasing uncertainty, and 
struggling to meet the demands, why do we have 
to give these “others” the right to complain? 80
Different conceptions conceal different 
ontologies. Rorty “straddles the individualist/
collectivist divide, celebrating irony and 
creativity in the private sphere and a non-
ironic version of liberalism in the public.” 81 In 
addition, he has little attention to the issue 
of the resentment of contingency and “no 
exploration of possible connection between 
the globalization of contingency and the role 
played by the project of world mastery in 
modern politics.” 82 Rorty disavows a world of 
telos, but at the same time he does not dispose 
of a mechanical description of the relation 
between human beings and the rest of the 
universe; genuine novelty can occur in a world 
of blind, contingent, mechanical forces. 83 His 
conception of contingency works in a linear, 
law-like formula. 84 Is a self or a society, after all, 
a consequence of historical inevitability? Rorty 
says:
Christianity did not know that its purpose 
was the alleviation of cruelty, Newton did not 
know that his purpose was modern technology, 
the Romantic poets did not know that their 
purpose was to contribute to the development 
of an ethical consciousness suitable for the 
culture of political liberalism. But we now 
know these things, for we latecomers can tell 
the kind of story of progress which those who 
are actually making progress cannot. 85
In his view, the historical developments which 
lead up to our time are the means to the end to 
be achieved. One historical moment continues on 
to the fixed goal. There is little room for doubt 
that what the world is might be otherwise. 
2‒2  The Problem of Agency and A World 
of Becoming
A linear, law-like formula conceals some 
tacit assumptions of agency. Connolly raises 
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a question of agency because he thinks that 
traditional images of human agency in the 
monotheistic traditions are bound up with the 
idea of free will and replete with ambiguity 
and paradox. 86 The human will was presented 
by Augustine to separate human beings 
categorically from both unfree nature and 
an absolutely free God. Human free will, in 
the idea of Augustine, has a triad: nature 
without evolutionary possibility, a human 
estate with severe limits, and a God. Before 
the Fall, the perfectly free act of human will 
was a perverse act of rebellion. After the Fall, 
human freedom becomes confounded: we can 
will evil by ourselves but cannot will the good 
unaided. 87 In Augustine’s scheme free will and 
original sin bind together to locate the ultimate 
responsibility for evil within humanity. 88 His 
solution to the problem of evil is connected 
with a strong doctrine of responsibility: every 
discernible evil must be caused by some agency, 
and so blameworthy as to be treated as the 
embodiment of an evil will. 89 After Augustine, 
philosophies of a mechanical universe either 
tend to drop the idea of will from human life 
or to introduce an “anthropic exception,” which 
allows us to explain and control nature. 90
In Connolly’s view, no fully adequate conception 
of human agency is available today with every 
conception of agency contestable, 91 but a shift 
from Augustine triad is necessary: to a 
heterogeneous world composed of interacting 
spatio-temporal systems with different degrees 
of agency. 92 It is to appreciate multiple degrees 
and sites of agency, flowing from simple natural 
processes, through higher processes, to human 
beings and collective social assemblage. 93 It is a 
concept ion of  d istr ibuted agency .  This 
conception of agency does not presuppose a 
conception of linear progress of time; time is 
irreversible, but irreversibil ity does not 
automatically mean progress. 94
Agency is never consummate; 95 it is not 
always human. In a world of becoming, a world 
beyond human subjects is composed of multiple 
forces of different degrees of agency that 
interpret, crudely or subtly as the case may be, 
the environment upon which they act. 96 This 
process operates in nonhuman nature as well as 
human.97 This is what Connolly reads into the 
Jamesian philosophy of A Pluralistic Universe. 98
James contends that the universe itself is 
marked by a plurality of forces, with “litter” as 
one of its components while rejecting a block 
universe, a classical, elegant picture in which 
everything is entirely reduced to some law-like 
formulas partly because “a consistently thought-
out monistic universe suffers from as from a 
species of auto-intoxication―the mystery of the 
‘fall’ namely, of reality lapsing into appearance, 
truth into error, perfection into imperfection; of 
evi l ,  in short ;  the mystery of universal 
determinism, of the block-universe eternal and 
without a history, etc.” 99
This philosophy of pluralistic universe 
identifies with a world of becoming, in which 
changes in some systems periodically make a 
difference to the efficacy and direction of 
others. 100 There are “litter,” vibrations, bits of 
noise in each system that do not fit perfectly 
into it, so new things can come into being, 
ruffling an established set of connections or 
throwing them into crisis. Multiple force-fields 
in a world of becoming periodically impinge 
upon a specific force-field, sometimes activating 
the litter in it in a new way.101
This view of the world includes cares for the 
diversity of being. Connolly says in connection 
with James:
According to the feeling-imbued philosophy of 
a pluralistic universe, to care about the 
diversity of humanity writ large is to take a 
step toward caring about the larger world 
that courses through and around us. It is to 
care about litter in motion in the creativity of 
a cockroach, the fecundity of rainforests, lava 
flows, swimming DNA, the sonority of the 
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human voice, turbulent water flows, and the 
human body-brain-culture network. Above all, 
it is to care about that delicate balance 
between creativity and stability that enables 
nature and civilizations to change while 
maintaining themselves. To appreciate the 
element of energetic uncertainty circulating 
through the world is to cultivate cautious 
solicitude for the world. 102
So construed, the world we live in cannot be 
designed for us alone, nor can we master it 
entirely; we cannot insulate ourselves from the 
rest of the world; our civilization might not have 
happened. 103 The affirmation of a world of 
becoming can refine our sensibility to, cultivate 
our ethical dispositions for the world, and “act 
resolutely in it world without existential 
resentment.” 104
Conclusion
In the present paper, we have tried to 
clarify the link between ontology and political 
theory in Connolly’s work in comparison with 
other contemporary thinkers. Liberalism has 
its own metaphysical assumptions, essentially 
contestable. The separation of the private 
sphere from the public in the liberal doctrine 
intensifies existential resentment instead of 
soothing it. The paradoxical relations between 
agency and responsibility inscribed in the 
doctrine are in play. To affirm the contingency 
of one’s identity and the world, and on this basis, 
to cultivate agonistic respect for difference 
is absolutely necessary today. A world of 
becoming is an alternative ontology through 
which to see political life and within which to 
conceive political theory.
There are criticisms of Connolly’s political 
theory, in particular, by those who question the 
relations between theory and political action. 
Although Connolly insists that a pluralist ethos 
contains all the features necessary to ground 
and defend political actions, he has provided few 
details about what exactly these features might 
entail. 105
This type of criticism is directed toward the 
“leftist” thinkers in general. Rorty writes: “The 
Left, the party of hope, sees our country’s moral 
identity as still to be achieved, rather than as 
needing to be preserved,” in contrast to the 
Right, who hopes to keep that identity intact. 106 
On the other hand, he takes a harsh stance of a 
“cultural left” within the academy; he says that 
the cultural Left will have to shed its semi-
conscious anti-Americanism to form alliances 
with people outside the academy. 107 He goes so 
far as to say:
To take pride in being black or gay is an 
entirely reasonable response to the sadistic 
humiliation to which one has been subjected. 
But insofar as this pride prevents someone 
from also taking pride in being an American 
citizen, from thinking of his or her country 
as capable of reform, or from being able to 
join with straights or whites in reformist 
initiatives, it is a political disaster. 108
Rorty, who has inspired reflections about 
identity/difference relations and ethics , 
nonetheless retains a flat conception of the 
relations, contributing.to the contempt for the 
academic left he seeks to protect. 109
Connolly has attacked those on the Left 
who have too close a view of the systems they 
criticize; they tend eventually to lapse into 
resignation or to slide toward the authoritarian 
practices of the Right. 110 How to counter the 
“thick” network of the Right? For this purpose, 
any “thin” conception of politics without 
ontology is not enough. He says: “Liberal images 
of the procedural nation are not only insufficient 
in themselves, they tend to collapse under 
pressure from rightist orientations to the nation 
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that are more thick and dense.” 111
In closing, some important issues are yet to 
be examined in the current article, especially 
his vision of the politics of becoming as related 
to a world of becoming, which I would like to 
investigate a next time.
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